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Summary
Background: There is an increasing tendency to reconfigure acute
hospital care towards amore centralised and specialisedmodel, partic-
ularly for complex care conditions. Although centralisation is pre-
sented as “evidence‐based”, the relevant studies are often challenged
by groups which hold perspectives and values beyond those implicit
in the literature. This study investigated stakeholder perspectives on
the rationale for the reconfiguration of urgent and emergency care in
Ireland. Specifically, it considered the hypothesis that individuals from
different stakeholder groupswould endorse different positions in rela-
tion to the motivation for, and goals of, reconfiguration.
Methods: Documentary analysis of policy documents was used
to identify official justifications for change. Semi‐structured inter-
views with 175 purposively sampled stakeholders explored their
perspectives on the rationale for reconfiguration.
Results: While there was some within‐group variation, internal
and external stakeholders generally vocalised different lines of argu-
ment. Clinicians and management in the internal stakeholder group
proposed arguments in favour of reconfiguration based on effi-
ciency and safety claims. External stakeholders, including hospital
campaigners and local political representatives expressed argu-
ments that focused on access to care. A “voter” argument, focused
on the role of local politicians in determining the outcome of recon-
figuration planning, was mentioned by both internal and external
stakeholders, often in a critical fashion.
Conclusion: Our study adds to an emerging literature on the
interaction between a technocratic approach to health system plan-
ning advocated by clinicians and health service managers, and the
experiential “non‐expert” claims of the public and patients.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Health care reconfiguration has been defined as a “…deliberately induced change of some significance in the distribu-
tion of medical, surgical, diagnostic and ancillary specialties that are available in each hospital or other secondary or
tertiary acute care unit in locality, region or healthcare administrative area”.1 Within the acute hospital sector, there
is an increasing tendency to reconfigure towards a more centralised and specialised model, particularly for complex
care conditions.2 This is characterised by the consolidation of services across a region on fewer hospital sites serving
a higher volume of patients, to improve efficiency and outcomes.3 Several studies have supported the benefits of high
volume, specialised units for coronary, stroke, and major trauma patients because of an apparent association with
better outcomes.4-7
1.1 | Perspectives on the evidence
Although centralisation is presented as “evidence‐based”, the relevant studies are often challenged by stakeholders
who hold perspectives and values beyond those implicit in the literature.8 Proposals to centralise services often face
public opposition, arising from concerns about future access to services.9,10 Plans to downgrade or close Emergency
Departments have been particularly controversial.2 It has been argued that volume should not be understood in
isolation as a justification for centralising emergency care, particularly as the volume‐outcome relationship has not
been studied for many emergent conditions where fast access is important. It has also been argued that other factors
such as geography and population needs may support a less centralised model in many contexts.11 Centralising care
can have unexpected impacts on sub‐groups of the population.3 Some groups, such as the elderly, those with low
socioeconomic status, and those with suboptimal transport access, may reduce their use of health care services when
journey distances increase due to the increased costs associated with added travel.12,13 Also, increased journey dis-
tances may result in an increased risk of mortality for some patients, offsetting any benefits that may arise from
receiving care at a specialist unit.14
Public sector health care bodies have been characterised as “pluralistic” in the organisational literature15and
should, ideally, satisfy the requirements of actors within and outside of the organisation in order to garner their sup-
port.8,16 It has been suggested that policymakers have tended to prioritise efficiency and effectiveness criteria when
configuring health care, rather than seeking to balance the priorities of different stakeholders and fitting a solution to
incorporate these priorities.15,17 This implies that implementing “out of the box” reconfiguration based on interna-
tional evidence on centralisation alone is not likely to be accepted by stakeholders in different contexts.
1.2 | Framework of perspectives on reconfiguration
Spurgeon et al10 synthesised previous research on perspectives on reconfiguration, particularly centralisation,2,18 into
a framework of 4 arguments. Those in favour of reconfiguration typically employ an economic “taxpayer” argument
about efficiency and cost‐benefit improvement and a public health “patient” argument based on the likelihood of
improved outcomes. Those against put forward a “consumer” argument based on a demand for easy, convenient,
and affordable access, and a politically driven “voter” argument based on a demand for local control of services.
The framework distinguishes between “popular” and “technical” goals and highlights the role of “institutional
pressures”, such as financial constraints and regulatory initiatives, in shaping the goals of different stakeholders. In this
study, we use the framework (Figure 1) to investigate perspectives on the underlying drivers of urgent and emergency
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care reconfiguration in the Republic of Ireland. Specifically, we investigate the extent to which individuals from
different stakeholder groups endorse different positions in relation to the motivation for, and goals of, reconfiguration.
1.3 | Context
The Health Service Executive (HSE) is the public sector body responsible for the delivery of urgent and emergency care
in Ireland through emergency departments, acute assessment units, andminor injury units. In 2006, theHSE introduced
a “Transformation Programme” designed to change the organisation of care delivery across 8 regional hospital net-
works.19 Urgent and emergency care was a specific service reconfiguration project and favoured a “hub and spoke”
model. The “hubs”were larger hospitals where complex care was proposed to be centralised. The “spokes”were smaller
hospitals which were to focus on lower severity cases. The reconfiguration initiatives occurred during a period when
the Irish health care regulator was carrying out investigations into the quality of care provided by a small number of
low volume Emergency Departments.20,21 These investigations prompted a broader HSE review of small Emergency
Departments and provided further impetus to the reconfiguration programme. To date, the implementation of this pro-
gramme has differed across the country. Regional characteristics and a summary of the reconfiguration undertaken are
shown in Table 1. The changes have largely consisted of closing or “re‐designating” (ie, downgrading) the function of
smaller Emergency Departments and associated acute services in the Southern, Western, Mid‐Western, and North‐
Eastern parts of the country, and centralising complex care to larger tertiary hospitals in Dublin, Cork, Galway, and Lim-
erick. Campaigns to resist these changes were organised in all 4 regions. Similar changes were planned for the South‐
Eastern region but were abandoned. There has been little attempt to reconfigure urgent and emergency care in Dublin
city although some rationalisation of individual services such as coronary and stroke care has occurred and 1 small
Emergency Department close to the city was changed to a local injury unit. The country now has radically different
models of provision in different regions, and these variations do not seem to be related to underlying geographical con-
straints. The South‐Eastern region, for example, currently has 4 Emergency Departments and a population of 511 070
(1 per 127 767 persons), while the Mid‐Western region has 1 Emergency Department for a population of 385 172.22
These regions have very similar geographies and population densities. County Dublin, which is largely urban, has 6
Emergency Departments and a population of 1 345 402 (1 per 224 233 persons).22
FIGURE 1 Classification for types of goals for health care system reconfiguration [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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TABLE 1 Regional characteristics and summary of reconfiguration undertaken
Significant reconfiguration
Region Characteristics Summary of regional change
South (Cork and Kerry) Population: 689 750
Area (km2): 12 161
Regional reconfiguration
• region‐specific reconfiguration plan largely
implemented, beginning 2012–2013
• region‐wide clinical governance structures established
• single general practice (GP) out of hours co‐operative
Emergency department services reconfiguration
• acute stroke, coronary and major trauma care provided
at hub in Cork [Cork University Hospital] with support
of ambulance protocols and outlying centres [Kerry:
University Hospital Kerry; Cork: Bantry General
Hospital]
• 2 EDs reconfigured to local injury units [Cork: Mallow
General Hospital (2013) and Bantry General Hospital
(2013)]
• one emergency department (ED) closed [Cork: South
Infirmary Hospital (2012)]





• region‐specific reconfiguration plan largely
implemented, 2009–2013
• ambulance bypass protocols and region‐wide clinical
directorates established
• single GP out of hours co‐operative
Emergency department services reconfiguration
• all emergency care centralised to 1 hospital [Limerick:
University Hospital Limerick]
• 2 EDs reconfigured to local injury units [Clare: Ennis
Hospital (2009); Tipperary North: Nenagh Hospital
(2009)
Some reconfiguration
Region Characteristics Summary of regional change
West (Galway, Roscommon,
Mayo, Leitrim, Sligo, Donegal)
Population: 709 497
Area (km2): 22 649
Regional reconfiguration
• clinical directorates established across the region
• several out of hours GP co‐operatives
Emergency department services reconfiguration
• single hub for acute coronary and major trauma care
[Galway: University Hospital Galway] with major
trauma support services provided at other centres
[Mayo: Mayo University Hospital; Donegal:
Letterkenny University Hospital; Sligo: Sligo University
Hospital]. Acute stroke care at all centres, excluding
Roscommon general hospital
• 1 ED reconfigured to local injury unit [Roscommon:
Roscommon General Hospital (2011)]






• region‐specific reconfiguration plan partly implemented
from 2006 to 2010
• limited regional clinical governance
• roll‐out of general practitioner (GP) out of hours care
Emergency department services reconfiguration
• some centralisation of trauma, acute stroke and
coronary care [Cavan: Cavan General Hospital; Louth:
Our Lady of Lourdes Drogheda] with rehab support in
other hospitals
• Dublin North [Mater Hospital] is the percutaneous
coronary intervention (PCI) centre with supporting
ambulance protocols
(Continues)
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2 | METHODS
2.1 | Design and data collection methods
This is a qualitative study using documentary analysis, and interviews with stakeholders across all 8 hospital network
regions in Ireland. Documentary analysis was used to identify official justifications for reconfiguration. Document
selection was guided by a broad definition of policy to include any published decision or action a Government makes
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Significant reconfiguration
Region Characteristics Summary of regional change
• 2 emergency departments reconfigured to local injury
units [Louth: Louth County Hospital (2010); Monaghan:







• informal clinical network with shared regional rota for
emergency medicine consultants
• single GP out of hours co‐operative.
Emergency department services reconfiguration
• designated hub for major trauma, and acute coronary
care [Waterford: Waterford Regional Hospital—PCI
Centre supported out of hours by Cork] with ambulance
bypass protocols
• acute stroke care available at all 4 hospitals
• no ED in Carlow






• multiple out of hours GP co‐operatives
Emergency department services reconfiguration
• centralisation of acute stroke, coronary, and trauma care
to 2 hospitals (both in Dublin South City) but limited
differentiation and integration between both
• 1 ED reconfigured to local injury unit [Dun Laoghaire
Rathdown: St Columcille's Hospital (2013)]
• 1 ED with reduced hours [Dun Laoghaire Rathdown: St
Michaels (2003)]
• no ED in Wicklow
Little reconfiguration
Region Characteristics Summary of regional change





• no major changes
• out of hours GP co‐operative established
Emergency department services reconfiguration
• 3 large emergency departments with limited governance
integration and differentiation of services. PCI Centre
established [Dublin North: Mater Hospital]






• limited integration of clinical governance
• several out of hours GP co‐operatives operating
Emergency department services reconfiguration
• centralisation of acute stroke [Kildare: Naas General
Hospital; Westmeath: Midlands Regional Hospital
Mullingar, and Dublin South: Tallaght Hospital)
coronary care [Dublin South: Tallaght Hospital] and
trauma [Offaly: Midland Regional Hospital Tullamore;
Dublin South: Tallaght Hospital) at several hospitals,
supported by ambulance bypass protocols
• no ED in Longford
(Regional characteristics were referenced from the Central Statistics Office, 2016).
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(or chooses not to make) in relation to services,23 or a political process consisting of several connected decisions.24
Official health policy documents published by the Irish Government or the HSE from 2005 to 2015, and all documents
from official state agencies or interest groups that influenced health policy during that period, were reviewed. Draft
and unpublished versions were excluded. The websites of the Irish Department of Health, HSE, professional institutes
and the Irish national health care regulator were searched, along with reference lists of policy documents obtained.
The relevance of all documents selected was discussed and agreed by consensus among the research team. A break-
down of policy documents analysed by domain can be accessed using the link to electronic supplementary material
provided at the end of this article.
Semi‐structured interviews were conducted in 2014 and 2015 by 2 interviewers with a range of stakeholders to
explore their perspectives on the drivers of urgent and emergency care reconfiguration in Ireland. Participants were
sampled using purposive and snowball sampling methods. An initial purposive sample of participants who were cen-
trally involved in the reconfiguration process was identified in policy documents. Snowball sampling was then used to
identify a broader group of internal stakeholders, by asking participants to suggest individuals they believed could
contribute to the study. External stakeholders were identified by local media coverage of reconfiguration or were sug-
gested by other interviewees.
Stakeholders were categorised according to their role in the health system reconfiguration. The term “internal
stakeholders” referred to a heterogeneous group of non‐clinical (management and patient advocates) and clinical
(doctors and nurses) staff working in the public health service. It included those directly working within the regional
HSE management structures and involved in reconfiguration planning and implementation at either a national or
regional level, as well as front‐line clinicians (including clinical leaders with a national remit) working in HSE hospitals.
The term “external stakeholders” referred to those working outside the HSE and included public and private ambu-
lance representatives, general practitioners (GPs), private hospital representatives, representatives of civic groups
such as campaigns to prevent the closure of local Emergency Departments, local media representatives, and local
politicians.
Potential participants were contacted via e‐mail or telephone and invited to participate. Interviews were carried
out in 2014 and 2015 in either the participants' or researchers' place of work. The topic guide was based on the
framework shown in Figure 1 and can be accessed using the link to electronic supplementary material provided at
the end of this article. Recruitment was concluded in each region when the required diversity of stakeholders had
been reached. A digital recorder was used for each interview. In addition, the researchers wrote a reflective summary
after each interview and held regular debriefing sessions to discuss the memos and to critically examine any potential
research bias.
2.2 | Ethical approval
This study was approved by 2 research ethics committees. All stakeholders were ensured anonymity in the publication
of study findings, identified only by region, and provided written consent to participate.
2.3 | Analysis
Interviews were transcribed by 2 researchers, and emergent findings were discussed regularly with the larger research
team. It was agreed that saturation had likely been reached in the first 123 interviews and that full transcription of the
remaining interviews was not necessary. The researchers listened to the remaining 52 interviews to ensure that this
was the case and selectively transcribed material to provide additional quotes for the themes that had been
established in the first 123 interviews. Documents and interviews were imported to NVivo software for data manage-
ment. Two researchers independently coded half of the interview data each. To ensure consistency in application of
the coding framework, the researchers met regularly to compare coding within and across both data sets and discuss if
additional codes should be added. A framework analysis approach was used for both sources of data.25 Following
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familiarisation, policy goals and stakeholder opinions on the reasons for change were initially mapped onto the frame-
work of arguments shown in Figure 1. The framework was initially tested by indexing a sample of the data. This was
reviewed by the team before the entire dataset was indexed. Personal memos were used to track decisions and chal-
lenge any personal or professional biases in interpreting the data. Findings were refined after discussion with the full
research team.
We considered the hypothesis that individuals from different stakeholder groups would endorse different posi-
tions in relation to the motivation for, and goals of, reconfiguration. Participants' accounts were classified according
to their compatibility with taxpayer, patient, consumer, and voter type interests. Where appropriate, participants'
accounts were classified in more than 1 argument of interest. Quotations were selected to represent the essence
of each argument.
3 | RESULTS
Twenty‐two policy documents were analysed. They included official documents relating to all or part of the provision
of urgent and emergency care, including national and regional hospital reconfiguration reports, health care regulatory
reports at specific hospital sites, and national clinical programme reports. A description of interviewees by region and
stakeholder type is shown in Table 2.
The 4 types of argument illustrated in Figure 1 were found to be sufficient to cover the material collected during
the study. No regional differences were found, but differences were clearly found across stakeholder groups. A small
number of contrarian views within stakeholder groups were present, particularly among internal clinical stakeholders.
3.1 | “Taxpayer” argument
The “taxpayer” argument for health care reform was obvious in many national26-32 and regional33-35 policy docu-
ments. This argument focused on the efficient use of resources in order to maximise the benefits of public spending.
Reorganising care “…in the appropriate location, with reduced duplication and maximum sharing of resources”28 was
considered optimal in “…getting best value from health system resources”,26 and thereby deemed “…efficient for the


























Internal 8 12 11 14 13 20 13 14 105
Management 3 2 3 3 3 10 4 4 32
Doctor 3 5 5 5 6 6 4 6 40
Nurse 2 3 3 5 4 3 4 3 27
Patient advocate 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 1 6
External 9 4 8 10 6 16 8 9 70
Ambulance 0 0 2 3 0 3 2 2 12
GP 3 1 3 3 2 5 2 2 21
Private emergency department 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 3
Civic groups 2 1 1 2 0 4 1 1 12
Local media 1 1 0 0 2 2 1 0 7
Local politician 3 0 1 2 2 2 2 3 15
Total 17 16 19 24 19 36 21 23 175
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taxpayer”.27 Regional documents echoed this national claim, arguing the need to support the efficient achievement of
reconfiguration: “…developing a health service which is efficient and cost effective”.33
Many internal (clinical and non‐clinical) stakeholders across the 8 regions used a “taxpayer” style of economic
argument to justify their support for reconfiguration. It was claimed that maintaining and developing the current num-
ber of acute hospitals at a desirable standard was unaffordable and that not all Emergency Departments were
sustainable without increased resourcing for inter‐reliant services such as acute surgery, anaesthesia, and intensive
care. These stakeholders also argued that not every Emergency Department attendance was an emergency and that
a more efficient streamlining of patients to more appropriate settings was considered a priority: “… people realised that,
right, if we want to keep giving a high standard of care with less resources, we need to do it differently and I think that really
was a positive part of the recession. It gave us all a wakeup call and made us realise that we can do things well and we don't
need to be spending a fortune” (Internal nursing stakeholder, RegionW/NW). Almost all internal stakeholders across the
8 regions supported the idea of centralisation. This view was also shared by some external stakeholders, mainly GPs,
local politicians, and local media, who emphasised the importance of being pragmatic if the service was to be sustain-
able: “…an A&E on the corner of every town in every village in the country… just not feasible” (Politician, Region NE).
However, the “taxpayer” argument was challenged by some internal clinical and external stakeholders who saw
reconfiguration as a cost‐saving initiative: “The driver is always money… It is not patient quality” (Internal nursing stake-
holder, Region DS); “...they're saving money but they're not saving lives unfortunately. It's the patient who is suffering”
(Hospital campaigner, Region NE). There was also scepticism among some internal clinical and external stakeholders
about the claim that centralisation of care led to efficiency gains. Many cited disruptions to safe and efficient care pro-
cesses at hub Emergency Departments due to an increased volume of patients. These were apparent in increased
ambulance handover times, Emergency Department waiting times, and increases in the number of patients on trolleys
awaiting admission. The extra costs incurred in dealing with these disruptions, such as hiring locum staff and paying
for private ambulance transfers for step‐down care in order to free up acute beds, were referred to as “…crippling”
the acute hospital service (Internal managerial stakeholder, Region MW). Many internal and external stakeholders
questioned the role of smaller hospitals in the aftermath of reconfiguration, claiming that they were being
underutilised for elective activity. Some internal stakeholders referred to a culture of bureaucracy underpinning
change that creates further inefficiencies: “They restructure and reconfigure and it just means another layer but they
never take out the previous layers” (Internal nursing stakeholder, Region SE). A concern among several GPs was that
their service was increasingly expected to absorb urgent care that had previously been delivered in the hospital set-
ting, without commensurate resources: “…a cheap commodity and a vehicle for [policy makers] to get what they want for
cheaper and deliver a great political promise” (GP, Region MW).
3.2 | “Patient” argument
A “patient” argument for reconfiguration, citing the need for quality and safety reforms to improve patient outcomes,
was present in many national policy documents.26-28 A series of regional hospital reconfiguration reports similarly
stipulated the need for a critical mass of medical workforce and workload for the purpose of providing a guaranteed
quality of acute care.33-35 Quality and safety arguments were also used to make the case for designing reconfiguration
plans around academic partnerships between acute hospitals and designated medical schools.28,33
Almost all internal (clinical and non‐clinical) stakeholders used the “patient” argument to justify reconfiguration.
There were a number of allusions to international evidence to support the centralisation of health care: “…international
evidence…would suggest that all of these patients do better where they're brought to a site that has a number of different
specialties on that site, they can effectively deal with whatever's presented to them” (Internal managerial stakeholder,
Region D‐Mid). Several internal stakeholders referred to investigations by the Irish national health care regulator:
“There had been a number of adverse incidents throughout the country and I think there was a realisation that, you know,
we have to improve the quality of care” (Internal nursing stakeholder, Region W/NW). Concerns raised by the Irish
health care regulator about the variability of out‐of‐hours' senior medical cover in small Emergency Departments were
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described by 1 internal managerial stakeholder as “…the sole reason” for reconfiguration (Region NE). Several internal
stakeholders stated that smaller Emergency Departments did not have sufficient on‐site support from other acute ser-
vices such as surgery, anaesthesia and intensive care: “…if you have no surgeon in a place well then you're not going to
have an anaesthetist, are you? If you don't have an anaesthetist you're not going to have an intensive care. If you don't have
an intensive care, anaesthetist and a surgeon, you can't really look after trauma, can you?” (Internal medical stakeholder,
Region S). Smaller hospitals were seen by a number of internal stakeholders as requiring formal academic partnerships,
as this would increase the number of clinicians rotating through these sites while training, and also increase the inter-
est and involvement of senior clinicians working at hub university hospitals.
Some internal clinical stakeholders were less inclined to agree with broad generalisations about the safety of
smaller Emergency Departments. They argued that regulatory investigations at a small number of hospitals had been
used to enact a larger wave of changes across the country without evaluating each hospital on a case‐by‐case basis.
They felt that planning had become a “…knee jerk response” to regulatory pressure (Internal managerial stakeholder,
Region DS). Another concern was that insufficient consideration had been given to the post‐reconfiguration volume
of patients attending hub hospitals, which had now become “…a very unpleasant environment in which to experience
your healthcare” (Internal medical stakeholder, Region MW). It was further claimed that the closure of smaller
Emergency Departments would inevitably disrupt historical relationships between the smaller local hospital, primary
care, and the community: “…previously I would have known the sister and the junior sister in the A&E and I would know
that I could always ring up and most times there was one of them on… I don't know who's who now” (GP, Region S). There
was also a belief that longer journey times would outweigh the benefits of travelling to larger, specialist centres, as
well as concerns about the quality of care at hub hospitals due to overcrowding. GPs expressed mixed opinions on
the centralised model of care and its impact on the patient. One GP explicitly supported a technical patient
safety argument: “Doing things well you have to be reaching a certain threshold…familiarity breeds good practice” (Region
D‐Mid). Others were concerned that out‐of‐hours primary care would not be able to compensate for the closure of a
local Emergency Department and that this would create a separate unanticipated set of safety issues.
Some stakeholders, both internal and external, expressed cynicism about the role of academic clinicians in shaping
the outcome of reconfiguration planning and questioned whether academic partnerships were necessary to deliver
safe services. It was stated that some reconfiguration plans were biased towards the training and research needs of
medical schools rather than local population needs and had disrupted historical relationships between hospitals: “If
it wasn't for the medical schools, the logical thing to do was have the whole North East together” (Internal medical stake-
holder, Region NE). Some stakeholders considered this to be a “...land grab” opportunity (Internal medical stakeholder,
Region SE) for the sake of building academic partnerships: “…all that kind of gaming goes on” (Internal managerial stake-
holder, Region SE). It was argued that matching service plans to local needs should trump academia in the order of
priority: “…it's about providing clinical services in the first instance, it's about training in the second instance and then
the academics and all these other things … should be the secondary aim or tertiary aim” (Internal medical stakeholder,
Region NE).
3.3 | “Consumer” argument
Both policy documents and stakeholder accounts referenced the need for an accessible urgent and emergency care
system. What this meant and how it should be achieved in the delivery of urgent and emergency care differed among
stakeholders. Many policy documents referenced the need to deliver “…enhanced local care provision”,28so that
patients would “...not have to travel to the larger hospital”.27 The notion of balancing the desire for efficiency with
the needs of a local community was also recognised: “…developing a health service which is efficient and cost effective
but which also is responsive to the needs of communities”.33 National clinical programme reports emphasised the
need to recognise “… the essential role of large and small hospitals, general practitioners (GPs) and community
services” in improving patient care.31
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Internal stakeholders reported they were aware that access was an important dimension of urgent and emer-
gency care and sought to frame their position as focused on delivering as much care locally as possible while concen-
trating only complex care in larger specialist centres: “…we [local rural hospital]… would retain 90 per cent of the
activity… Actually we have retained 95 per cent of it to be honest” (Internal medical stakeholder, Region S). Nevertheless,
the implication of a number of statements made by internal stakeholders was that travel distance was considered sec-
ondary when formulating reconfiguration plans for patients with complex care needs. Campaigners were often
portrayed by internal stakeholders and some GPs as naive in their vision of what was best for the patient: “I think
the public wants a hospital next door. They don't want to travel. They want their hospital right next to them and if you
ask the public that's what they'll tell you, but whether that's good for them or not… I think you need to go with the expert
opinion on it” (GP, Region DS).
External stakeholders (mainly hospital campaigners including local political representatives) typically viewed local
access to emergency care services as a self‐evident “good” and were willing to provide justification when prompted.
They cited the additional risks and financial burden associated with longer travel times: “[An] emergency occurring in
Castletownbere that has to be transported to Cork, you are looking at an absolute minimum, even under blue light, of
two and a half hours in ambulance” (Hospital campaigner, Region S). They also made reference to the importance of
familiarity with local services and staff as an often neglected element of high quality care: “I mean of course we want
centres of excellence where people are building up their experience, where you do have the best technology and so on and so
forth but that shouldn't mean [taking out] the sort of local point of contact and you know that place which is easy to go to
where you're familiar with people” (Politician, Region DS). Moreover, they expressed satisfaction with the quality of
services provided in their local area and believed that smaller hospitals could deliver care that was just as good as
larger hospitals if they were properly resourced: “…a hospital like Monaghan can do just as good if it is resourced properly”
(Hospital campaigner, Region NE). Some external stakeholders asserted that hub hospitals were inferior in some
respects because of the overcrowding that had been induced by the closure of smaller Emergency Departments:
“We're just finding that the bigger hospitals are being overloaded” (GP, Region NE).
3.4 | “Voter” argument
“Voter” arguments focused on the symbolic and financial value of health care services to local communities, and the
need to retain local control of planning decisions. Some policy documents acknowledged the validity of this argument.
Local hospitals were referred to as “…part of the community” and contributing “…to the local economy”.28 The associ-
ation between hospitals and academic partners was advocated on the grounds that it would deliver “…financial gain
and contribution to economic growth”,28 and “…realise for the people of [a given] region the economic and other ben-
efits that flow from strong education and training, and leading edge health, research, technology and innovation”.33
Many external stakeholders and some internal stakeholders stressed the importance of retaining local control of
hospital services. They spoke about the symbolic status of the hospital: “…it's got to do with almost the town's worth and
its identity and its self‐importance… If people are coming to develop, outside industrialists and investors, they'll ask is there
an airport nearby, what's the road network, is there a university, ask if there's a hospital” (Media, Region SE). Some internal
stakeholders acknowledged the importance of hospitals to the local economy but were sceptical about the validity of
this concern: “People are horrified when you raise with them 'well actually it's not fit for purpose'. They don't care. It's there
to employ people” (Internal medical stakeholder, Region W/NW). This scepticism was particularly evident when inter-
nal stakeholders discussed the motivations of local politicians and their role in the planning process: “It's all about
votes” (Internal medical stakeholder Region W/NW). Supporting the closure of a local Emergency Department was
viewed as “…political suicide” (Internal medical stakeholder, Region W/NW). External stakeholders were also wary of
the motives of politicians who took part in campaigns while in opposition but then abandoned their stance while in
Government. They argued that sometimes planning decisions were influenced by the desire of local politicians to
avoid being blamed by the public. This led to instances where a local service was “…slowly strangle[d] to death” through
neglectful practices such as not filling empty consultant posts (Hospital campaigner, Region DS). This, they believed,
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minimised political damage by allowing hospitals to “...wither on the vine” where staffing was concerned (Hospital
campaigner, Region DS). This kind of political interference was unanimously considered to be unjustified among inter-
nal and external stakeholders: “…you've every local politician with a placard saying 'oh we want to keep this service in this
hospital, our patients deserve it'. It's bloody daft, like you know, that needs to be dealt with" (GP, Region D‐MID).
4 | DISCUSSION
4.1 | Summary of findings
This is a large‐scale qualitative study that presents a unique insight into the motivation for, and goals of, urgent and
emergency care reconfiguration in the Republic of Ireland. While there was some variation in perspectives within the
stakeholder cohorts, the internal and external stakeholder cohorts tended to use different lines of argument. Clinicians
and management in the internal stakeholder group generally advocated arguments in favour of reconfiguration based
on efficiency and safety claims. External stakeholders expressed arguments that focused on access to care and rebut-
ted claims about efficiency and safety. The “voter” argument was mentioned by both internal and external stake-
holders, often in a critical fashion. Overall, there was dissatisfaction with the state of public discourse in this field
and with the overall quality of the policy making process.
Our findings broadly resonate with those of previous studies on health care system reconfiguration.2,10 However,
our study found a more unified position among internal clinical and managerial stakeholders than has previously been
reported. Policy documents may have played a powerful role in framing centralisation as a clinical necessity, and many
of these documents were influenced or written by senior clinical leaders in Ireland. This may have contributed to the
co‐opting of internal clinical stakeholders to technical arguments in favour of reconfiguration and shaped their gener-
ally negative views on the arguments made by external stakeholders. The dominant influence of technical arguments
in health planning is an emerging phenomenon in the literature on the discursive practice of policy.15,36 Jones15 sug-
gests that much current public discourse about health care delivery in its current form is influenced by a technocratic
ideology which values abstract “expert” knowledge over and above the experiential “non‐expert” claims of the public
and patients.
4.2 | Efficiency arguments
Claims about the efficiency benefits of reconfiguration were disputed. Internal stakeholders argued that centralising
urgent and emergency care would result in a more efficient system, but there was a marked scepticism about these
claims among other interviewees. This scepticism is not unwarranted. Smith37 noted that conceptualising, measuring,
and improving efficiency in health care is fraught with difficulty. A 2015 review by Imison et al38 of 123 proposed
reconfiguration projects in the UK found no evidence of significant savings resulting from reconfiguration. It is note-
worthy that most reconfiguration in Ireland occurred in rural areas, where significant investment in community and
ambulance services would normally be required to alleviate the harms associated with reduced access.10
Reconfiguring services in urban areas particularly in Dublin, where 6 Emergency Departments continue to operate
in close proximity to each other, would appear to offer greater scope for efficiency gains, without necessarily affecting
the timeliness of access. It is unclear why major emergency care services in Dublin have not been centralised if effi-
ciency is a genuine driver of reconfiguration in Ireland. It is possible that the 6 acute hospitals in Dublin are “protected”
from rationalisation because of other factors which are not made explicit to the public when reconfiguration plans are
discussed. These include the desirability of living and working in Dublin for many clinical staff compared with other
parts of the country, and the importance of each Dublin hospital as training and research sites for the 3 medical
schools in Dublin.
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4.3 | Patient safety arguments
Policy documents and internal stakeholder interviewees generally asserted the need to centralise complex emergency
care at a small number of urban‐based hospitals. External stakeholders generally disagreed and argued that reconfig-
uration had increased the fragility of the care system in certain regions by relying on a single facility. They also argued
that evidence about the volume‐outcome relationship only applies to a small proportion of the cases seen at Emer-
gency Departments. While certainly relevant to discussions about the delineation of hospital services, the volume‐
outcome relationship should not be the sole basis for policy‐making. Harrison11 cautions cherry picking or exaggerat-
ing the strength of the evidence because the volume‐outcome literature is not generalisable to every context and con-
dition, and can result in high‐performing smaller units closing and poor‐performing larger units expanding. There is
also evidence that centralisation of emergency care leads to increased travel time for patients living in rural areas,39,40
and that distance to an Emergency Department is negatively associated with patient outcome.40,41 Centralisation is
not an “inevitable” interpretation of the literature in this field, and alternative approaches have been implemented in
countries with challenging geographies. For example, certain Australian regions have developed policies and incen-
tives to sustain local rural hospital facilities rather than transferring their resources and patients to larger centres.42
4.4 | Access‐related arguments
Both policy documents and internal stakeholders tended to frame access and quality/safety as part of a larger “appro-
priateness” construct. The goal of reconfiguration was to design a system that delivered patients as quickly as possible
to a facility that was appropriate for the severity of their condition. External stakeholders provided a nuanced critique
of this vision highlighting the harms associated with increased travel times and concerns about the quality of care at
the designated hub hospitals. It is notable that alternative models of care were given little or no consideration in either
official policy documents or by internal stakeholders. The focus of policy makers was on ways to mitigate the harms
associated with reduced access rather than how to avoid inducing these harms at all. It is also notable that complex
care for rural populations in the North Eastern and Midlands regions is largely provided by hospitals in Dublin rather
than by facilities within those regions. This has led to a situation where the major Dublin hospitals are now the de
facto hubs for adjacent geographical regions despite being at the extreme periphery of those regions. This somewhat
undermines the notion that access and quality/safety are given equal consideration when choices are made.
4.5 | Arguments related to community values and local politics
External stakeholders argued for local control of services, stressing their role in supporting the broader health of com-
munity life. This argument has support in the international literature. Local hospitals have been found to play an
important symbolic role in community life43 and are a major contributor to local economies.44,45 Moreover, it has been
suggested that downgrading the services provided by local hospitals may have a negative effect on perceptions about
the overall quality of health care in a community.46 There was a notable degree of cynicism from both internal and
external stakeholders regarding the motivations of politicians and their involvement in debates around health care.
Nevertheless, some of the politicians we interviewed articulated the sense of value that communities placed in their
local hospitals, offering an important counterbalance to the orthodox narrative of rationalisation. Jones47 notes that
modern hospital planning is often driven by a coalition of managers and medical professionals and underpinned by
an ideology of centralisation that does not necessarily align with the wishes of the public. This approach appears to
value the views of specific interest groups over others within the plurality of perspectives around health care provi-
sion.48 It would be unfortunate if the cynical actions of some local politicians create a perception that any involvement
by elected representatives in the planning of local health care services is “interference” rather than a natural part of
the democratic process.
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4.6 | Limitations
There are some limitations to this study. The number of representatives interviewed from private emergency medi-
cine, patient advocacy, and local media is disproportionately less than other stakeholder types. There is also a discrep-
ancy in the total number of stakeholders interviewed in each region, with more in the South region than in other
regions. However, the absolute number of interviewees in each stakeholder group was still relatively large by the nor-
mal standards used for qualitative research. It is also notable that the study findings were very consistent across
regions, and it is unlikely that a larger sample size would have changed this.
4.7 | Conclusions
This study adds to an emerging consensus that merely presenting communities with evidence to justify planned
changes is not enough to persuade them to support reconfiguration1,48 and may in fact contribute to public opposition
by reinforcing the notion that “expert” opinion is more valuable than the views of the public.48 Arnstein49 has argued
that information‐sharing approaches may be viewed as tokenistic or manipulative by the public, serving only to dem-
onstrate the power imbalance between decision‐makers and citizens. A striking feature of our document analysis is
the extent to which health planning in Ireland is led by health care providers such as the HSE, or by employees of
the HSE acting in a consultative capacity. Ireland does not have independent health planning bodies, tasked with tak-
ing into account national and regional population needs and the views of patients and the public when considering the
optimal configuration of services. This increases the danger that population health needs become secondary to the
concerns of providers, such as difficulties with staffing smaller hospitals.
Our study portrays a confused and dysfunctional public discourse about urgent and emergency care provision in
Ireland. Internal stakeholders are largely wedded to a “follow the evidence” model of decision making. This is despite
concerns about the generalisability of the chosen evidence to different contexts in Ireland and the narrow focus on
evidence about volume‐outcome relationships for a small number of conditions. External stakeholders present largely
reactionary arguments, focused on rebutting the arguments put forward by those in charge of the reconfiguration pro-
cess. The results of this study should be used to inform future health care reconfiguration initiatives in Ireland, both
for urgent and emergency care, and for other sectors. Future consultation should be conducted in a way that genu-
inely respects the range of perspectives advanced by all stakeholders and not designed solely to overcome opposi-
tion.50 While it is unlikely that a “perfect” approach exists, there is evidence that certain factors are associated with
positive public engagement. The best outcomes have been found in cases where the engagement process started
at the early stages of planning, the public were offered opportunities for genuine interaction, the process was led
by clinicians involved in delivering the service in question, and public representatives were engaged with.50 The need
to move to pluralistic public engagement strategies is particularly pressing in an international policy landscape where
authority and expertise are coming under increasing public scrutiny.
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